11 December, David Laborde, Carin Smaller, Mali Eber-Rose and Elsa Olivetti

Research finds that more than 80% of aid to agriculture and food security screened had no climate mitigation objective, and over 60% had no climate adaptation objective. A new Agriculture and Food Security Aid Tracker can help bridge the gap.  

Agriculture and food systems are one of the main perpetrators of climate change contributing between a quarter and a third of global greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon emissions from large-scale deforestation, methane emissions from rice and animal farming and nitrogen emissions from fertilizer use are among the main sources. Most commercial agricultural production also relies on fossil fuel for its energy.  

At the same time, those who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods in developing countries are the primary victims of climate change and suffer from the highest levels of food insecurity globally. From the drought in the Horn of Africa, to the flooding in Pakistan, climate change is now one of the primary drivers of hunger, which has been rising for six years in a row. Clearly, the relationship between agriculture, food security, and climate change are closely intertwined.  

In 2021, more than 80% of the foreign aid grants to agriculture and food security screened were found to not have a climate mitigation objective, and over 60% did not have a climate adaptation objective. 

Of the USD 14 billion of official development assistance (ODA) allocated for agriculture and food security in 2021, USD 12 billion was screened to determine whether it had an objective related to climate mitigation or adaptation. Of the USD 12 billion screened, USD 10 billion (82%) was marked as not having a climate mitigation objective, and USD 7.5 billion (61%) was marked as not having a climate adaptation objective, either as a principal or significant objective in the design of the project (See Figure 1). In other words, of all the aid spent on agriculture and food security projects in 2021 that was screened, only USD 2.2 billion was spent on projects with an objective related to climate mitigation and USD 5 billion on projects with a climate adaptation objective. 

The screening uses the data for ODA flows from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) which is the main global ODA database. It allows donors to mark projects which have climate or environmental objective as 0 (not targeted), 1 (significant objective), or 2 (principal objective). An unmarked project means no screening occurred. 

FIGURE 1

Note: ODA grants for agriculture and food security calculated using Ceres2030 definition. Value for ODA grants disbursed in 2021 in current 2021 USD prices. Proportion of ODA marked with significant or principal objective calculated using OECD Rio Climate Markers. 

Expanding the screening beyond climate change to include other environment-related markers, in 2021, found that more than 43% of the foreign aid grants to agriculture and food security did not have environment objective, 77% did not have a biodiversity objective, and 85% did not have a desertification objective.  

Of the USD 14 billion of ODA allocated for agriculture and food security in 2021, USD 12 billion was screened to determine whether it had an objective related to the environment or biodiversity, and USD 10 billion was screened for an objective related to desertification. Of the USD 12 billion screened for have an environment or biodiversity objective, USD 5.4 billion (43%) was marked as not having an environment objective, and USD 9.6 billion (77%) was marked as not having a biodiversity objective, either as a principal or significant objective in the design of the project (see Figure 2). Of the USD 10 billion screened for a desertification objective, USD 8.8 billion (85%) was marked as not having a desertification objective. In other words, of all the aid spent on agriculture and food security projects in 2021 that was screened, only USD 7.1 billion was spent on projects with an environment objective, USD 2.9 billion on projects with a biodiversity objective, and USD 1.6 billion on projects with a desertification objective.  

Figure 2

Note: ODA grants for agriculture and food security calculated using Ceres2030 definition. Value for ODA grants disbursed in 2021 in constant 2020 USD prices. Proportion of ODA marked with significant or principal objective calculated using OECD Rio Climate Markers.  

What is the problem?  

When taking a closer look at the OECD-DAC database, accompanied by interviews with donors, reveals three problems in how donors are linking aid to agriculture and food security with climate action.  

1. There is an inconsistent use of the climate change markers by donor representatives who are inputting the data into the OECD-DAC.  

The climate-related policy markers are optional: an added layer of analysis that donors can choose to use when recording their ODA disbursements. Consequently, there are inconsistencies in their use between donors. Among the top 10 donors of agriculture and food security ODA grants (according to the Ceres2030 definition), Canada, EU institutions, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States screened all of their agriculture and food security ODA grants against the climate markers, the United Kingdom did not screen approximately 79% of its funding, and the International Development Association did not screen any. This prevents the policy markers being used to offer definitive insight into the volumes of ODA being channelled towards climate-friendly and sustainable agriculture and food security initiatives.  

2. The design of the climate markers, with a strong environmental framework, means that many agricultural projects that do have a climate link do not align with the requirements of the marker.  

Even if donors were consistent in their use of the markers, money allocated to agriculture and food security projects with strong links to the climate are excluded when donor representatives record their aid due to the design of the markers. This is because the process by which the policy markers were developed can, in some cases, inhibit synergies across sectors. For example, the design of the climate marker largely stemmed from the multilateral environmental agreements and not from agriculture and food security indicators. Consequently, a number of sustainable agriculture projects do not align with the requirements of the marker. Climate-smart agriculture projects and crop-diversification projects, despite potentially contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation, may not be considered in the climate marker. Therefore, there may be more money spent on sustainable agriculture projects than is indicated by the markers.  

Furthermore, the aid is recorded according to intention, not impact. If a project has an explicit outcome that is intended to adapt to climate change then it will be marked as having a principal climate outcome. However, climate adaptation outcomes can occur independent of the intention. For example, a project to invest in small-scale irrigation to help farmers improve productivity, increase incomes and reduce hunger, may have a strong impact in helping those farmers adapt to climate change, particularly rainfall variability. This project may not have been marked as climate-related as this was not an initial objective, despite being a clear outcome. According to one G7 donor, for every project that could have a principal climate change outcome, there is a 56% probability that these projects are not being coded as such.  

3. The lack of consensus on a definition for quantifying aid to agriculture and food security means the total amount of aid for agriculture and food security is contested and the full extent of the links across sectors unknown. 

Despite an agreed definition on what constitutes food security and the use of a shared aid database, a common framework to measure ODA to agriculture and food security is lacking. Currently, there are over ten operational definitions each yielding different estimates of total resources spent and the trends in spending. The lack of clarity on the amount of ODA spent on agriculture and food security creates further confusion on how much of this addresses climate mitigation or adaptation. Estimates for the volume of ODA spent on agriculture and food security in 2021 range from USD 7 billion to USD 63 billion, depending on the definition adopted (see Figure 3). 

FIGURE 3

Note: ODA for agriculture and food security calculated using Ceres2030 definition. Value for ODA grants disbursed in 2021 in constant 2020 USD prices 

A deeper analysis of the problems in defining ODA to agriculture and food security is explored in a series of forthcoming notes by the FAO and the Shamba Centre for Food & Climate as part of a new project, Hesat2030. 

The case for the Agriculture and Food Security Aid Tracker 

The close link between agriculture, food security, and climate change requires donors to have a tool to track, monitor, and analyse how their aid is designed, where is it going, and what impact it is having. To progress towards a more coherent framework, the FAO and the Shamba Centre, as part of the Hesat2030 project, are building a platform for donors to better understand and assess their contribution to multiple sustainable development outcomes, particularly SDG 2.  

The new Agriculture and Food Security Aid Tracker will provide donors with greater transparency on how they are recording ODA to agriculture and food security, and whether it is linked to climate action. Through artificial intelligence tools, such as text mining, it will help donors identify the aid that offers the strong linkages with climate change but is missing due to inconsistent use of the climate markers or poor coding. The new tracker will also examine the extent to which aid is aligned with scientific evidence on the most effective ways to achieve SDG 2.   

Ultimately, it will help donor agencies and advocates make the case for more ODA that links agriculture, food security and climate change, and make sure that they are not missing opportunities to leverage the billions of dollars of aid going to climate finance to accelerate progress towards SDG 2 and sustainable food systems transformation. 

David Laborde is Director of the Agrifood Division at FAO and Co-Chair of Hesat2030; Carin Smaller is Executive Director of the Shamba Centre for Food & Climate and Co-Chair of Hesat2030; Mali Eber-Rose is Research and Policy Analyst at the Shamba Centre for Food & Climate; and Elsa Olivetti is a Research Analyst at IFPRI.